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SUMMA R Y 
I 
Recent work in the social studies of science has empha- 
sized the importance of studying both the social and 
cognitive wsgects of the evolution of scientific specialties 
and disciplines. This has implications for science policies 
that aim at the direction of scientific fields toward 
external goals: the cognitive state and dynamics of the 
fiefd have to be taken into acount. Such a cognitive 
approach to science policy has been elaborated by a 
nunjber of German science scholars. The three-phase 
model of scientific developn,ents and the rinalization 
thesis of the Starnberg group is discussed, and the policy 
imprications are critically reviewed. A group based in the 
University of Bielefeld has published case studies 
designed to trace the role of c:ognitive factors in explain- 
ing the impac: of science policy qrogrammes on scien- 
tific fields. It turns out that mutual adaptation processes 
occ!Ir in the tours: of formulating the programmes 
vdhlf:h reduce conflict and resistance. In conclusion, 
z~~n~e :>e,Pspectives for further work are noted. 
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1. Introduction 
Science policy has devoted itself to the problems of organization and of 
allocation of money [l]. Although scientific advisers are called in to review 
the stat: of a science and its potential for new and useful developments, the 
substance of science has normally been out of bounds for policy making. 
Such a set-up is legitimated by, and through its continued existence supports, 
the view that science, which concerns cognition, has no intrinsic connection 
with politics, which concerns power. 
The limits to growth of the science budgets, as well as pressing technologi- 
cal and social problems, have led policy makers to take a second look at this 
division of territory. More or less at the same time, developments in the his- 
tory, sociolcgv and philosophy of science occurred emphasizing the necessity 
of looking at social and cognitive aspects of science together; one example is 
the renewed discussion and study of the role of external factors in the devel- 
opment of science. When it is also realized that politics is not only the play 
of power and clashes of interests, but also includes cognitive aspects like 
assessments of situations and outcomes, reasons for goals and priorities, etc. 
the orginal contrast between cognition and power is amplified to n 2 X 2 ma- 
trix (see fig. 1). 
Because of the interactions within the rows and columns of the matrix of 
fig. 1, external influence on science is possible, decisions in the political 
sphere eventually affecting the outcomes of scientific research. From this 
perspective, insight into the cognitive, as well as social state of a science 
becomes a prerequisite for a wise policy. Recent work in the social studies of 
science has made the ‘black box’ of science and the dynamics of its develop- 
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culture 
rtxnts somtwhat ransluc+., thus providing material for what I shall call a cog 
netibtx” approach to dm&? poiicq * 
Otirn, soceal studies of scicnc~~ are not designed with any science-poliq 
rcittvance in :niltd. 4 group of i;crman science scholars (Wissenschaftsfiir- 
s~hc*]~ formcsly based at the d:;x. Planck In,titut in Starnbrrg, has made a 
c:oncr”rted attempt to construe’ a model of the development of science with 
c#i& pohq implications [Z--4]. Using the same ccgnitive approach, some 
members U‘ this group have collaIx)rated with science scholars from the Uni- 
versity of Eiclcfeld in analysing the inpact of policy measures on th.e develop- 
ment of sciences iS,bj. In this paper I give an outline of some main points 
al~l -1 criticai review of the two recent books, Die gesellschaftliche Orien- 
! G-nrrlg tics w&se!zs -4aftlichetz Fortschit ts [ 4 ] and Geplante Forschung [ 61. 
To set the scene, I shall briefiy refer to recent trends in the social stbidies of 
%. t~mKe. 
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“L. The dynamics of the development of science 
Fig, 2 shows how Thomas Kuhn’s model of the paradigm-guided develop- 
ment of science has led to a flood of research in the social studies of science. 
A lot of empirical material on the d.evelopment of scientific specialties and 
research areas has been accumulated [7], with some attempts at systematize- 
tion [B]. Separate approaches that can be distinguished at the moment ale 
scientometrics, especially with the help of citation analjrsis [‘,I. an anthropo- 
1962 
1964 
1966 
1968 
197c 
1972 
1971’ 
197t 
197t 
198( 
4- 
3- 
3- 
3-. 
History 
of science 
Paradigm-guided 
Influence on : 
Studies of scientific 
specialties and determinant:. 
of development in science 
Proilferation and attempts 
at systemadzation 
Philosophy 
of science 
Scientometrics Cognitive approach Anthropological approach 
Fig. 2. Recent trends in the study of the dynamics of science. 
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logrcal approach [lo], and a cognitive approach, when1 the cognitive develop- 
ments are not treated as a black box, but are amenable to sociological analysis 
[l i]. 
Kuhn [ 121 has shown, on the basis of historical evic‘.ence, that the develop- 
ment of scienc:e proceeds with periods of normal scien:e - where scientists in 
a discipline or specialty share ;i common paradigm ar’rl work towards its fur., 
ther articulation and refir,ement - alternating with periods of revolutionary 
science - where concern about anomalies and proposals for alternative para,- 
digms throw the discipline into a crisis until one of the alternatives wins out 
and a new period of normal science ensues. The paradigm provides cognitive 
norms or regulatives for ongoing research in a discipline, and through the 
shAred commitments of the members of the discipline also a sense of com- 
mllnity . According to Kuhn, successive para(iigms are in a sense incommen- 
surable, and the transition between them requires a GestaZt switch that is 
likened to a conversion. 
Although the function of a paradigm in providing regulatives for research 
drld building a disciplinary community has been widely accepted, the other 
features of Kuhn’s model have not. Paradigms, even if they are called ‘central 
dogmas’, may be abandoned without fight or crisis symptoms [13]. Thle 
incommensurability thesis has been a challenge to the philosophy of science 
tib come up with new theories of rational progress in science [ 141. The Starn- 
berg group has pointed out that old paradigms may sometimes live on besides 
lheir successor and continue to be used, although with a clear sense of the!rr 
limitations. Their criticism of Kuhn is a stepping-stone toward their own 
nlodel for the development of science. 
The paradigm of classical mechanics, although replaced by relativistic me- 
ciranics, and on the molecular and atomic level by quantum mechanics, is 
srili valid for most purposes, and has a certain self-sufficiency that leads us 1.0 
expect that it will remain valid. Heisenberg has introduced the mction of a 
‘closed theory’ to describe such cases, and the Starnberg group has tried LO 
develop more precise criteria for such cognitive stabfility [ 151.. From the 
example of classical mechanics, and others like electromagnetism, ,hermody- 
ramics, and molecular chemistry, they conclude that paradigms may become 
mature: the regulatives for research are no lovrger directed to articulation lor 
the paradigm, but toward application and specification for new or more COITI- 
pkx objeA domains. Examples would be thermodynamics of Lving systems, 
mechanics and electrodynamics of plasmas. 
A second difference with Ku.nn’s model is that the ,Satarnberg group recog- 
nizes that the pre-paradigmatic stage, mentioned by Ku:rn, has its own ch,ar- 
acteristic research strategies, and can be recognized in many contemporary 
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disciplines (for instance, microbiology until quite recently, medical and 
public health science). The Starnberg group thus distinguishes three possible 
cognitive states of scientific disciplines, and in addition claims that they rep. 
resent successive phases in their historical development [6, pp. 13-161. 
(1) Exploratory phase. There is as yet no theory that organizes the field, em- 
plrical, trial-anderror str;:tegies abound, discovery is more important than 
explanation. 
(2) Paradigm phase. A fundamental (gru~~?legende, i.e. fundamental with 
respect to the domain of the specialty) theory is proposed, accepted and arti- 
culated further. The problems po::d by such theory development regulate the 
activities within the field and so take precedence over other concerns. Xuh- 
nian revolutions or gradual evolution may exchange one fundamental theory 
for another, but theoretical explanation remains the overriding concern. 
(3) Postparad&natic phase. The fundamental theory is stable (according to 
cognitive and/or social criteria) and the mature paradigm can be exploited 
for other goals, internal or external to science. 
The policy implications of the Starnberg model for the development of 
sciences are bound up with the vaLe the Starnberg group attaches to deve!op- 
ments in the third, post-paradigmatic phase. Compared with the paradigm 
phase, the internal regulatives lose much of their force and there is room for 
external regulatives, i.e. external goals that are trarslated into guidelines for 
research and specific theory development. The river of science has, as it were, 
reached its delta and can now be made to change its course very easily. The 
internalization of external goals is called j’irzalizakn, and the resulting speoi- 
alized developments are called finalized specialties or discipiines [3; 16, pp. 
210-220; 171. 
An example of a finalized discipline is hydrodynamics, a branch of physics 
in which classical mechanics is developed specifically to account for the 
phenomena c.f flow. New theory development is necessary because the equa- 
tions of classical mechanics cannot be solved for the complex proi:esses of 
flow. Vital to the specialized development is the intrcduction of a guiding 
concept (Anwendungsgrundla;le), in this case the concept of a boundary ia,i ST 
adhering to objects or surfaces along which the flow passes. Around this con- 
cept, the basic equations of hydrodynamics are builT up, and the resulting 
theory continues to apply the conceptual apparatus of classical mechanics, is 
legitimated by it, but cannot be derived from it [ 191. The regulatives of hy- 
drodynamics are external to classical mechanics, although they car. be con- 
ridered to be internal to physics. Historically, they are related to attempts to 
systematize the technical knowledge of hydraulics [ 201. 
Another example is provided by plasma physics, itself ;i specialized devel- 
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opment from mechanics and electrodynamics to treat the tlehaviour of ionized 
gases in electromagnetic fields (plasmas). Again, guiding Loncepts are neces- 
sary. e.g. to obtain the equations of magnetohydrodynarGcs. External goals 
have provided additional regularives in the specialty of thermonuclear fusion 
research, where the behaviour of plasmas in specific geometries and with sur- 
face effects are treated. The specialty was born during the 195Os, when the 
crash programme to develop a fusion reactor failed and fundamental knowl- 
edge had to be gained to advance further. The external economic goal of 
delivering energy dictated possible geometries, as well as the inclusion of the 
effects from the walls of a reactor. Having become regulatives of the new 
specialty, they didn’t need to bt: enforced by management, but were inte- 
grated in the workings of the scientific community of the specialty [ 211. 
The last exarnple shows why the Starnberg group emphasizes the impor- 
tance of finalization. In finalized specialties, a middle-of-the-road alternative 
appears to be realized between the extreme positions in the science policy 
debate. namely complete autonomy of scientists versus centralistic planning. 
In principle the research can proceed autonomously because the external 
policy goal is internalized as a regulative in the specialized paradigm of the 
of the finalized specialty. In practice, additional direction will often be neces- 
sary [22], while the creation of such a paradigm is not ;I trivial problem but 
a screntific challenge by itself. 
When a discipline does not possess a mature paradigm, finalization is not pos- 
sible. Attempts to direct the development toward external goals cannot profit 
fror,t the insight into the nature of the object domain that is provided by a 
stable fundamental iheory, and are called func~ionulimtitin by the Starnberg 
group. Screening for functions and input-output relationships would be 
functional strategies. An example would be the xreening of chemical sub- 
stances for pharmacological effects, while a more theolry-oriented strategy 
would be to develop structure-activity relationships co lind explanations of 
the effects in terms of mechanisms. other examples of functionalized disci- 
plines are econometric modelling, based on extrapola,i:ion of trends, and 
jystem dynamics (e.g. Forrester and Meadows world dynamics). 
&cording to the Starnberg model, functionnlization is easy in the explora- 
tar:’ phase of a discipline, because then there are no st rfong internal regula- 
tives that compete with the external direction. In the ?aradigmaiic phase, 
scientists resist external direction and .it may be argued that external direction 
.n this phase is counter-productive. Here, as with the notion of maturity or 
ripeness of a discipline, the Starnberg group takes over the ‘i:ommon sense’ of 
scientists in fundamental scientific research: functionahzation is f:ondemned 
;IS over-exploitation of a scientific discipline. They also ‘9 >iI:t to thz danger of 
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un_ritical uses when a frmdamental theory lacks or is neglected [ 16, pp. 234- 
2401. 
The policy implications of the Starnberg model can now be summarized as 
a t;lvofold advice: science scholars should diagnose the cognitive state of a 
discipline, and then policy makers should decide on light exploitation in the 
exploratory phase, stimulation in the paradigm phase, and finalization toward 
suitable ends in the post-paradigmatic phase. These implications have been 
drawn by the Starnber*s group members, and have led to acrimonious and 
often misdirected debate [23]. It should be noted, however, that the policy 
implications are progra nmatic: the Starnberg group itself has not analysed 
the effectiveness of policy measures in relation to the cognitive state of the 
disciplines concerned, but has concentrated en historical studies illustiaring 
and further articulating their views on the development of science [ 19,24-- 
27]. 
Attempts to make the policy implications nlore operational will face the 
difficulty that the concept of finalization is still rather vague (as has been 
noted b:r others [28]; in my presentation I have emphasized one possible 
interpretation in terrns of guiding concepts; compare also 11.71) and that it 
does not seem possible for science scholars to determine the maturity of 
a field unless they accept the judgement of the scientists working in it [29]. 
But these scientists, or the elite that frequents science policy circles, are 
already consulted on (1j.e issue of the ripeness of the field in many cases, so 
there seems to be no i;pecial role for the science scholar except that he ma;y 
contribute a non-interested opinion. In fact, when diagnosing the state of a 
discipline, the Starnberg group uses an implicit criterion of maturity, namely 
a reductionist relation to the central theories of physics, and more specifi- 
cally, a “micro-theoretical’ explanation of phenomena, i.e. in terms of invis- 
ible )>articles and their interactions. The reductionist slant has been noted by 
others [28, p. 3333 and is apparent in some of the articles (e.g. [3, pp. 3 lo-- 
31 11). The micro-theoretical explanation is explicitly used as a criterion 
of maturity in the analysis of the disciplines contributing ~to cancer research 
[JO] and to biotechnology [31], and mentioned in passing in [6, p. 43]. 
Symes has noted the same point, and tried to build a definition of maturity 
on it [32, esp. pp. 339-3401. 
For policy makers interested in manipulation and contlrol, the Starnberg 
model hys little to offer. The identification of fiialization and the conditions 
of its occurrence provides better insight into the working of contemporary 
science, but no direct policy advice. Furtirermore, the mod,el cannot be gen- 
eralized very far; technological disciplines and ‘formal’ disciplines (like mathe- 
matics, computer science) may show three phases, but even then have differ- 
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eni types of regulatives. And many important cases of problem-oriented 
rescarcli, do not fit the pattern because the main issue is ;he integration of dif- 
terent tliscipiinary contributions (compare the case stucies in [6], and the 
cx~mpl~~ps, as well as the general argument of [33]). 
Viewed as a first attempt, however, the Starnberg model i’hres better, and 
some more modest uses can be nated. Although the Starnberg group did not 
follow up the possibility, the importance of fundamental research is, in their 
mt)del, not a relief or ideology but an arguable and partially researchable 
proposition. If one accepts the reductionist view, contributions of different 
disciplines to the solution of a problem can be assessed and corresponding 
pc~licy measures devised [34]. An important result of the work of the Starn- 
berg Aroup is also that they have developed a vocabulary to analyse cognitive 
dcveloprtents that is adapted to the language of science policy. The case 
study of tusion research programmes in the US and FRG profits fron- the use 
01‘ the concepts of internal and external regulatives, [35] while functionaliza- 
tian and Anruazdurzgsgrundlage can be applied in analysing biotechnology 
]31.36]. S urv ys e and perspective reports of scientific disciplines will im- 
Fruve their analysis and recommendations by explicitly using such cognitive- 
policy language, as can he illustrated in the case of chemistry 8371. 
As 3 concrete example of the use of the Starnberg model, I present some 
results of Hohlfeld’s analysis of the cognitive state of cancer research [30]. 
Table 1 shows his diagnosis of the cognitive state of contributing disciplines. 
Looking more closely at the possibilities for mission-orientation of disciplines 
in the second, par.lJtgm pI*ase, 1Iohlfeld notes two research policy strategies; 
coincidence research and transfer research. (Examples are given in tabel 2.) In 
coincidence rese:rch, a system relevant to the overall mission (in this case, 
C‘~JWA prevention, control and therapy) is sufficiently manageable and rep- 
r-~sent Ihive to be used in the laboratory to develop the fundamental theory. 
l‘he ‘dirry’ systems normally found in practice can sometimes be studied 
using results obtamed on model systems as guidelines. Attempts to articulate 
tirtd modify such guidelines are called transfer research. The practice of coin- 
c idr-nce research at&d transfer research ha‘s, I am sure, been part of the folk 
avisdom of research marragement for a long time. Their conceptualization in 
terms of a model of SC ientitic development is the first step to further rationali- 
yation. The assessment of the contributing disciplines may also be useful, but 
it is harder to draw crnclusions nere, because Hohlfeld does not use his assess- 
men’ when studying the cancer resea::h programmes in the US and FRG 
1381 (but compare [34]). 
Another use of a first model for the development of disciplines and its 
?ohcy imnhcations is that it leads to improved models. One would expect 
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Table 1 
Disciplinary contribu tiom to cancer research 
~.- 
From stable theories 
- pathological anatamy (classification of tuniours) 
- chemistry (identifkation of carcinogens) 
-_ classical genetics (somatic mutations) 
-- biochemistry (met;1 holism of tumour cells) 
From theories b ing articulated 
- molecular biologyr of cells of higher organisms 
__ devel Jpmental biollegy of cells, tissues, organs 
From fields in an expl’oratory phase 
- human biology 
- medical science 
__ public health science 
Table 2 
Mission+orientation of fundamental research (examples from cancer research) 
PP- --- 
Coincidence research 
- differentiation in the system of hemopoietic (blood-building) cells, including malignant 
growth and its effects 
- induction of difkentiation in iymphocytes by immunological reactions, including 
reactions to tumour cells 
i?ansfer research 
- in-vitro cultures ,;I ‘dirty’ systems, e.g. lung cancer tumours 
the case studies of science policy programmes in FRG [6] to be an occasion 
to apply and refine the model. Although the vocabulary is used in some ease 
studies, ‘finalization’ is never mentioned - because of thle controversies that 
have sprung up around it, I suppose; compare [23] - and thd model is used 
sparingly, if at all. The emphasis of the book is on the resistance, and recep- 
tivity of scientific developments toward political direction. 
3. The political direction of science 
In Geplante Furschung, the question of the cognitive conditions for suc- 
cessful mission-orientation of scientific disciplines is tackled from the empi:- 
cal side. The cases selected for analysis have to extend beyond the applica,. 
tion of existing knowledge; the policy goals have to be attained by institu- 
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I$< trdjtati<sn I to sl:ecia~ scientific developments, i.e. new specialities or research 
ffcl~tb ~8th tne~r own dynamics. The empirical question is about the condi- 
TIC ns d’ ~UCICS~ of 2 dynamic initiated through the political direction of sci- 
ilil‘(’ wfxh rmplics that finalization may or may not turn out to be the 
IN,) of’ MC a-if the ~~~c~~sf~11 dynamics. In fact, the frame of reference of the 
The case studies look at biotechnology, information science, cancer 
rtr-xx~fr. ~~~~~~r~~rl~~~e~~tal esearch. thermonuclear-fusion research and heavy- 
~1s te~arzh. and have been sJec;ed because these fields have been subjected 
IC r*qla~it S’k%znrrz policy programs by the German federal government. Such 
a ~Wtio~ IS ~~~~~~~~~ to dis;tinguish between general promc’ion of science 
~1 3a’tual drtC&~n, dnd to provide an empirical basis for the identification 
c+: tl~s rrmId.ni #sf !!ic vA/*~ al Aira *i .r*?” *V.**%.*l a.=* ~,&.&.u U,.rCc~OX* The s:udy would then proceed by 
a ~lyatng ths mechanisms of the transformation of the external goals into 
t~gul.~rivcs (lf the rciearch process, and by o’)serving symptoms of resistance, 
wf ~4; ICI the external rcgrrlatives [6, pp. 239-2401. From the detailed study 
l?C tf;c c’;~ 1 ~t~~~~~,~~e~~~ has w be derived whether the resistance is mstitu- 
I wd (e.g, ttadiriotzs. inertia of organieations) orcognitive (cognitive deficits, 
~i~~flid‘f witl* iral.ern;al dynamics). Successf‘ul political direction is defined as 
!:I$ ~~~~~~~~~~1~~~1~~ of a change cJ directir,n of the scientific developments, not 
t I ~eit~rh 01‘ the lidfihent of the mission (which can never be a criterion given 
I!W Il;:IUlc” c,f sc.ierlriCli Wseril;h). 
Irn turns out 1 however. Dot science pohcy programmes and the social and 
t t*gn~w~f siate 01 the sciences at which they are directed are not independent. 
~~,~~~~~~?~~ ?~~ t ~.~t~~~~~ iI& the transformation processes that lead from external, 
t~dr~tr:aj RWIN to s;ienze policy programmes and their implementation, in
:uih J H :ly 3s to ;&pt the political drtmands to the perceived scientific possi- 
Mi3jc+s 01het adapi; tion processes \Nithin the politiza! as well as the scientific 
!\‘S1W32 p&&k’ dw a i de. Conflict potential is reduced by this process of mu- 
ud ~~~~~~~~~~~~ I but makes the task of the analyst who studies the impact of 
l~&l~~.J clilc”ction on science more difficult. Thr; process has to be traced in 
*!eIitiil t ~1~s has ~WII &me thoroughl;r for the case of environmenLdl research 
i .;<$I 8, hut evt’n then ccmclus~o~~s have to be basad on comparisons with what 
~~~~~~~~9~~d HI other countries and counter-factual speculations ,lbout what 
:o-& flW2 ~~a~~~~l~d if institutional structures or cognitive developments 
il3d been 1) ~f:!Ttvise. 
A GUI *‘. txr of steps can be distinguished in the transformalion process frum 
$Wak I(! !ti~ear~h regulativcs. In fig. 3 the dnalytical scheme devel_ 
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1 Social ;;biem 1 Cure for cancer 
I Political resistance 
I Political program I 
c 
ti 
Scientific 
input 
I Science policy program I 
1 , Researc\planning , 1 
Political resistance, e.g. 
other public health problems 
National Cancer Act (197’11, National 
Cancer Plan (additional centers, cancer 
control, etc.) 
Imminent breakthroughs ? 
Report of National Panel (1970) 
Restrictive structures in government 
administration, universities, etc. ; 
science seen as problem solver, etc. 
National Cancer Program Plan, Strategic 
Plan (goals, objectives, major rot8rses of 
action) 
Overestimation of fundamental research, etc. 
Opera ional Plan of the National Cancer 
Institl~te 
Gap tetween clinic. ant! laboratory 
Cognitive deficits in existing knowledge 
force change of strategy 
Fig. 3. The transformation or’problems. 
oped on the basis of the case studies is presented and illustrated with some of 
the steps taken in the co%lrse of crea?.ion and implementation of the National 
Cancer Program in the US [4, pp. 22-23; 40, p. 2231. The schcm~ consists of 
successive translations, which become tran,sformations because of the inter- 
vening filters (labelled ‘political resistance’, ‘restrictive structures , etc.). In 
addition, the most important scientific inputs are depicted. 
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The social problem, the cure of cancer, is already the result of transfor- 
mations of prol;lem defiiiiions, e.g. the expectation of a cure based on the 
experience of c;ther successful therapies developed by medical science. Tc? 
become transformed into a political programme, the social problem has to 
struggle for priority, in this case in public health policy. Besides the serious- 
ness of the problem and the amount of lobbying, a scientific input is neces- 
sary: science should promise at least. a partial solution in the near future. In 
the actual formulation of the political programme, scientific consultancy will 
influence which items are given prominence, and this will reflect the sta[e of 
the art in the relevant disciplines, as well as their institutional strengths and 
wea’knesses. 
By sir)gling out scientific research as providing tl,e main answer to rhe po 
1itica.l demand - which decision may have substsmial reasons, but also just 
follow the trend of considering science IS a catch-all problem solver, or be a 
manoeuvre to side-track the problem - the polit;:al authority has to provide 
a translation into a science policy programme. SC ientific consultancy is very 
important here, and disciplinary and institutio:lal divisions will determine 
part of the outcome. Administrative divisions and territorial struggles of 
government bureaucracies hould not be underestimated, however (environ- 
mental programs are a clear example [39]). Lotier down in the scheme the 
implementation of the science policy programn:e :is transformed by in!;titu- 
tional resistances, traditional disciplinary attitudlq etc. as well as by the suc- 
cesses and failures in the ongoing research. 
In the opening essay of Geplante Forsckung, van den Daele, Krohn and 
Weingart emphasize (even more than in the earlier version [40]) the impor- 
tance of so-called hybrid communities as the c;;rriers of the mutual adapta- 
tio:t process between politics and science [41, pp. 26-271. In many cases 
studied, groups were formed composed of scien’;ists, administrators and rep- 
resentatives of interest groups to effect the tran:;lation/transformation of the 
political programme into the science policy pro,yamme, and sometimes also 
to act as advisory committees or steering groups. Hn the exceptions that are 
noted (fusion research, one of the information science programmes), one 
could still point out that those scientists were selected that had an affinity for 
policy making [42]. The hybrid communities, c f which ;he officially consti- 
tuted groups may form only a small, but vi,sibltl part, arc the carriers of the 
process of transformation from external goals to research regulatives, and 
may perhaps also keep the research ‘on track’, ‘I.e. take over the function of 
the traditional disciplinary communities. This will only happen, however, if 
a rew[rd and career structure can be created that is accepted by the scientists 
that are to r’: the research. 
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As overall conclusions from the set of case studies, van den Daele, Krohn 
and Weingart note two main points. First, that the appearance of hybrid com- 
munities is an indicator for an attempt at political direction of science, while 
its success depends on the institutionalization of the external regulatives in a 
manner compatible wirh the internal regulatives. Secondly, that the cogGtise 
st.ate of a discipline and the nature of its internal regulatives are independent 
variables determining the attitudes of scientists towards external orientation. 
This implies that resistance of scientists cannot always be reduced by the 
institutional measures that administrators can take (e.g. mcney, opportuni- 
ties, career structures), and that science policy has to take the cognitive 
aspects of its policy object into account 141, pp. 34-35, 571; Compare also 
[35, p. 2891. 
4. Concluding comments 
It was noted already that the LYC studies in Geplantcl Forschung do not 
aim at a further articulation of the Sr;:rnberg model. In spite of their hetero- 
geneity of scientific fields studied a: .: analytical frameworks used, however, 
an important common aspect can be singled out. All fields studied combine 
contributions from different traditional disciplines, and1 struggle with the 
problem of integrating then., cogr ,$$J- as well as socially. Van den Daele, 
Krohn and Weingart v:iew the.se proicjql.~-oriented fields as complementary to 
traditional disciplinary science [4i, pp. 55-591. This implies to my mind 
that the concept of ;I fir: :lized science will only apply to contemporary 
problem-oriented science ii1 a ?<w e: ‘Potional cases. The parent disciplines 
have to be oriented towards an external goal only in cooperation; that is to 
say, that instead of a guiding concept (A12wen~l4ngsgrurz~SZ~r~e) an integrating 
concept (Integratiunsgmndlage) is necessary. The concept of an ‘integrating 
concept’ has been used by others in ,;nother context [43], but I think it 
would be useful to exl:end the Starnbcrg model in this wa;y and s?:e if some of 
its limitations can be overcome. 
A difficulty that will remain, and one that has been criticized already, 1s 
the assumption that science is homogeneous. The assumption is facilitated by 
the physicalist-reductionist outlook of the Stsrnberg group. which can al;o 
be recognized in some of the case studies in Gepfante Forschung. Because Jf 
the more empirical approach in the case studies, the assumption does not pl:iy 
an impcrtant role and, in fact, different kinds of disciplines are discussed, hly 
impression is, however, that the case studies do suppose a social and political 
homogeneity of scien:e, or at least negle& possible divisions in this respect 
(with the exception 0:’ a few side-remarks in the study of heavy-ions research 
A. Rip 
10, p. 3521). With increasing democratization of decision-making, divisions 
due to social stratification in science (including the technical assistants) will 
&a;.? their in~uence feit. And the controversial nature of many science- and- 
technology related decisions will activate latent politia:al differences between 
;&mists, as has happened already with re~ombina~~t-D~A research and in the 
biomedical field [44]. 
The politicization of science policy will also influence the composition of 
the hybl-id communities. 1o obviate accusations of one-sidedness, advisory 
committees on recombi rz-rt-DNA research ave to contain at least one certi- 
fied opponent. When tl is trend continues, the study of hybrid communities 
wih become an even more important ;ool for science policy studies than van 
den Daelle, Krohn and Weingart have shown it to be. 
In spite of its lactations, the Starnberg model has rendered an important 
service to science policy studies: it has focused attention on a cognitive 
approach to science policy. Ge~Z~~t~ Forschung ws inspired by it, and used 
some of its conceptual apparatus to demonstrate empirically that it is neces- 
sary to take cognitive factors into account in the analysis of science policy? 
and also, i would add, in science policy itself. A better model for the develop- 
ment ci’ scientific fields has not been proposed, but it is more important o 
continue this research tradition. In terms of the Starnberg model, it is in its 
exploratory phase, and it may even be exploited lightly for the external goal 
of improving science policy. 
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